The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with my commentary (in progress)

The text analyzed here is a modified version of Stephen Batchelor's translation of the Tibetan version of Nagarjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, taken from Stephen Batchelor, "Verses from the Center," Martine & Stephen Batchelor, www.stephenbatchelor.org/index.php/en/verses-from-the-center, accessed 22 August 2019. I have left Batchelor's translation untouched except that I have replaced the word "condition" with "cause," replaced "object" with "intentional object," and (where appropriate) replaced "cause" with "efficient cause."

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1. Investigation of Causes

1. No thing anywhere is ever born from itself, from something else, from both or without a cause.  

Commentary: For every x, none of the following are the cause of x:

• x itself ("from itself")
• something other than x ("from something else")
• both x and something other than x ("from both")
• nothing ("without a cause")

2. There are four causes: efficient causes, intentional objects, immediate and dominant. There is no fifth.

Commentary: The causes of x are answers to the question "Why does x exist?" or "Why did x happen?" There are four ways to answer such questions:

• efficient cause: what produced or brought about x
• intentional object: what x is about if x is a mental state
• immediate causes: the intervening causal steps between x's efficient cause and x
• dominant cause: the purpose or goal of x

For example, if x were "seeing a painting," then the question would be "Why are you seeing a painting?" and the four causes would be as follows:

• efficient cause: "Because my date pointed it out to me."
• intentional object: "Because there's a painting in front of me." (My visual experience of the painting is about the painting in front of me.)
• immediate causes: "Because my date's act of pointing out the painting stimulated my eardrums, causing an electric signal to travel to my brain, where it was processed, and my brain, in turn, sent an electric signal to my muscles, causing my head to turn toward the painting."
• dominant cause: "Because I want to appear sophisticated."

3. The essence of things does not exist in causes and so on. If an own thing does not exist, an other thing does not exist.

Commentary: Verse 1 said that x's cause cannot be x itself. Why not? Let's take a step back and ask what it would mean for x's cause to be x itself. The causes of x are such things as the person who designed x, the materials that went into making x, the tools that were used to sculpt x, etc. Call these things "the causes." By definition, x's essence is what makes x be x instead of something else. The causes clearly do not have x's essence, for they are different from x. Therefore, x's essence "does not exist in causes and so on."

But Verse 1 also said that x's cause cannot be something other than x. To see why, we must examine the Buddhist attitude toward abstract objects, such as universals and numbers.

Buddhist philosophers tend to reject abstract objects. For example, they rejected the universals (blueness, humanness, etc.) that other Indian philosophers accepted. The only blueness is the blueness of a particular blue object; there is no universal blueness existing independently of blue things. By the same token, if x's essence currently exists at all, then it exists in the concrete things that currently exist.

If x's essence can exist only in concrete things, then it does not exist at all before x exists. Before x exists, the only concrete things that exist are x's causes. We have seen that x's essence does not exist in x's causes. Before x exists, therefore, x's essence does not exist in any concrete things. As we just saw, x's essence can exist only in concrete things. Hence, before x exists, x's essence does not exist at all.

Now we can explain why x's cause cannot be something other than x. By definition, x's essence distinguishes x from everything other than x. If x's essence does not exist at all, then the distinction between x and everything other than x breaks down. As we just saw, x's essence does not exist at all before x exists. Before x exists, therefore, there is no distinction between x and things other than x ("If an own thing does not exist, an other thing does not exist"). Hence, x's cause cannot be something other than x.

4. There is no activity which has causes. There is no activity which does not have causes. There are no causes which do not have activity, and none which do have activity.

Commentary: The concept of causation has led us to a contradiction. As we have seen, neither x nor something other than x can be x's cause. Anything that exists must be either x or something other than x. It follows that x has no cause ("There is no activity which has causes"). At the same time, x must have some cause, some reason why x exists ("There is no activity which does not have causes").

The concept of causation leads to a second contradiction. On one hand, causes have the power to act ("There are no causes which do not have activity"). On the other hand, causes do not have the power to act ("and none which do have activity"). To see why this contradiction arises, we must turn to the next verse.

5. Since something is born in dependence upon them, then they are known as “causes”. As long as it is not born, why are they not non-causes?

Commentary: To understand how the second contradiction arises, we must recall the Buddhist resistance to abstract objects. There are no abstract objects; if x exists in any sense, then x exists concretely. Therefore, before x's causes produce the concrete object called x, x does not exist in any sense. By definition, x's causes are the things on which x depends for its existence. Therefore, they are x's causes only in relation to x. If x does not exist in any sense, then they can have no relation to x. Therefore, before x's causes produce x, they are not x's causes ("As long as it is not born, why are they not non-causes?"). But only a cause of x has the power to produce x. Therefore, before x's causes produce x, they cannot have the power to act (that is, the power to produce x).

Now we can explain how the second contradiction arises. On one hand, as we just saw, x's causes cannot have the power to act. On the other hand, x eventually "is born in dependence on" them, so they must have the power to act.

6. It is impossible for something that either exists or not to have causes. If it were non-existent, of what would they be the causes? If it were existent, why would it need causes?

Commentary: Whether x exists or not, it makes no sense to say that x has causes. If x already exists, then there is no need for anything to cause x. What if x does not exist? By definition, x's causes are the things that contribute to explaining x. Therefore, they are x's causes only in relation to x. Therefore, if x does not exist, then they are not x's causes. In other words, if x does not exist, then x has no causes.

7. When things cannot be established as either existent, non-existent or both, how can one speak of an “establishing cause”? Such would be impossible.

Commentary: No matter what x is, x must either exist nor not exist. As we just saw, whether x exists or not, it makes no sense to say that x has a cause. Therefore, the very idea that x has an efficient cause makes no sense.

8. An existent phenomenon is clearly said to have no intentional object at all. If the phenomenon has no intentional object, where can the intentional object exist?

Commentary: Why is an existent phenomenon⁠ "clearly said" to have no intentional object? Here I defer to Jay L. Garfield's answer:

If we consider a particular moment of perception, the object of the perceptual episode no longer exists. This is so simply because of the mundane fact that the arising of perceptual consciousness takes time. So the tree of which I am perceptually aware now is a tree that existed about one hundred milliseconds ago; not one that exists now. The light took some time to reach my eye; the nerve impulses from the eye to the brain took some time; visual processing took still more time. (Jay L. Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way [Oxford University Press, 1995], 117).

When I perceive a tree, I'm not perceiving the tree as it is at the moment of perception. Instead, I'm perceiving the tree as it was a moment earlier. Hence, my mental state's intentional object is the tree as it was earlier. The tree still exists, but the tree as it was earlier is no longer present. This point generalizes: in every case of perception, the mental state's intentional object is no longer present; it no longer exists concretely. Given the Buddhist allergy to abstractions, it follows that the intentional object does not exist at all. For any act of perception, there is no such thing as an intentional object.

9. If phenomena are not born, it is invalid for there to be cessation. Therefore, an immediate [cause] is unreasonable. What, having ceased, can also be a cause?

Commentary: Verse 1 told us that nothing can start to exist without a cause. But as we have seen by now, the very concept of a cause is problematic. Thus, we might conclude that nothing starts to exist. In Buddhist philosophy, starting to exist and ceasing to exist are inseparably linked: everything that comes into existence eventually goes out of existence, and vice versa ("If phenomena are not born, it is invalid for there to be cessation"). Therefore, we might conclude that nothing ceases to exist. This conclusion rules out the existence of immediate causes: an immediate cause is, by definition, a momentary step in a causal chain, a step that immediately ceases to exist.

If, therefore, immediate causes are real, then an immediate cause must cease to exist. Specifically, it must cease to exist before the next step in the causal chain. But there's a problem. If the immediate cause ceases to exist before the next step occurs, then how can the former cause the latter? ("What, having ceased, can also be a cause?") In the end, therefore, we must conclude that there are no immediate causes ("Therefore, an immediate cause is unreasonable").

10. Because the existence of essence-less things does not exist, it is incorrect to say: “When this exists, that arises.”

Commentary: The Mahayana doctrine of emptiness implies that, ultimately, nothing exists. Something counts as x by virtue of having x's essence. If x has no essence—that is, if there is no such thing as x's essence—then nothing can count as x. In other words, if x has no essence, then x does not exist. Most Mahayana schools agree that everything is empty of essence, though they interpret this teaching in different ways. Therefore, for every x, the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness implies that x does not exist.

Hence, the doctrine of emptiness dissolves the Buddhist concept of dependent origination. A common summary of dependent origination, going back to early Buddhism, says, "When this exists, that arises." In other words, we can explain the arising of one thing by pointing to the existence of another thing. As we have seen, the doctrine of emptiness implies that nothing exists. If nothing exists, then we clearly cannot explain the arising of one thing by pointing to the existence of another thing.

11. There is no effect at all in the causes individually or together. How can that which is not in the causes itself be born from causes?

Commentary: I see two ways to interpret this argument.

On one hand, we might take it more or less at face value. When we examine x's causes, we do not find x. If x is not already present in the causes, then it is hard to see how the causes can produce x. Wouldn't that be equivalent to creation ex nihilo?

On the other hand, Nagarjuna might be making a more subtle argument. As we have seen, Verse 3 points out that x's essence does not exist in x's causes. By definition, something counts as x by virtue of having x's essence. Therefore, to produce x is to bring it about that something has x's essence. In other words, x's causes cannot produce x unless they can give x's essence to something. But they can't give what they don't have. Because they don't have x's essence themselves, they should not be able to give x's essence to anything. Therefore, x's causes cannot produce x.

12. If, although the effect is not there, it is born from those causes, why is an effect not born from what are not its causes?

Commentary: Nagarjuna defends the premise that x's causes cannot produce x unless they already contain x. If x's causes can produce x without already containing x, then something completely other than x can produce x. If something completely other than x can produce x, then there seems to be no necessary connection between a cause and the effect that it produces; that is, it seems that anything should be able to produce x. Because not just anything can produce x, it is not the case that x's causes can produce x without already containing x.

13. Effects [are of] the nature of causes. Causes do not have own nature. How can those effects of what does not have own nature [be of] the nature of causes?

Commentary: Given the doctrine of dependent origination, anything that acts as a cause must itself be an effect of a prior cause. Or, to put it the other way around, effects are causes ("Effects [are of] the nature of causes").

Now, causes qua causes do not have essence ("own nature," svabhāva). In other words, if x is a cause, then being a cause is not part of x's essence. Even if we grant that x has an essence, x is a cause only in relation to its effect. Therefore, being a cause is not part of x's essence.

It follows that nothing can be a cause. If x is a cause, then x must be the effect of a prior cause. But being a cause is not part of the prior cause's essence, just as it is not the part of any cause's essence. If being a cause is not part of the prior cause's essence, how can it be part of x's essence? How can the prior cause give what it does not have?

14. Therefore, [it does] not have the nature of causes, nor is there an effect with the nature of non-causes. Since there is no effect, what could [be its] non-causes or causes?

Commentary: As we just saw, nothing can be a cause ("[it does] not have the nature of causes"). At the same time, the doctrine of dependent origination says that causes and effects are connected in an endless chain, so if something is an effect, then it must also be a cause ("nor is there an effect with the nature of non-causes").

Let's put these pieces together. If something is an effect, then it must also be a cause. But nothing can be a cause. Therefore, nothing can be an effect. If there is no effect, then it makes no sense to say that something either is the cause or fails to be the cause. Therefore, the concept of causes is incoherent ("what could [be its] non-causes or causes?").

2. Investigation of Coming and Going

1. Then there is no going in what has gone; there is no going also in what has not [yet] gone. Motion is unknowable apart from what has gone and not [yet] gone.

Commentary: Let's assume that an object is moving. At this moment, the object is at a certain location. Behind the object is the path that it has already covered; before it is the path that it has not yet reached. Where is the movement occuring at this moment? There are three possibilities:

• the path that the object has already covered
• the path that the object has not yet reached 
• the place where the object is now

Movement did happen on the path that the object has already covered, but there is no movement happening there now. Movement will happen on the path that the object has not yet reached, but there is no movement happening there now. The only remaining possibility is that the movement is happening at the place where the object is now.

But now we face a problem. There is no such thing as movement at a single place. By definition, movement is movement from one place to another. If we consider an object where it is at this very moment, we cannot say that the object is moving.

So the concept of movement is incoherent. If an object is moving, then the movement must be happening at some time. It cannot be happening in the past, because the past is past. It cannot be happening in the future, because the future is not here yet. The movement must be happening in the present, at the place where the object currently is. But we ruled out that third possibility.

2. Where there is moving, there there is going. Furthermore, because moving is within motion -- and is neither gone nor not [yet] gone, therefore, there is going within motion.

Commentary: Here Nagarjuna begins to elaborate on the argument in the previous verse. In the previous commentary, I equated "going" with movement, but this verse distinguishes the two. Obviously, anything that is moving is going somewhere, so we can say that going is present "within" movement.

3. How can going be possible within motion? Because motion that is not going is impossible.

Commentary: If something is moving, then it must be going somewhere. Therefore, it must be possible for going to coexist with movement.

4. For whomever there is going within motion, for him it will follow that there [could be] no going within motion, because there is going within motion.

Commentary:  To say that going coexists with movement is to treat going and movement as two distinct things. To treat them as two distinct things is to imply that one could exist without the other. Hence, to say that going coexists with movement is to imply that movement can exist without going.

The concept of movement has again led to a contradiction. On one hand, Verse 3 told us that anything that is moving must also be going. In other words, movement cannot exist without going. On the other hand, Verse 4 tells us that movement can exist without going.

5. If there were going within motion, it would follow that going would be twofold: that by which one becomes someone in motion [in a place] and [that by which one] goes in that [place].

Commentary: Nagarjuna begins a new argument against the concept of movement. We have said that going is "within" movement. In that case, someone who moves has two simultaneous "goings": the going-somewhere that we call his movement and a second going-somewhere by which going is happening within his movement. Let's suppose that only one person is moving; there must be two goings for that one person.

6. If going were twofold, the goer also would be twofold, because going is impossible without a goer.

Commentary: For every instance of going, there must be something that is going. Verse 5 told us that if one person is moving, then there must be two goings. It follows that there must also be two people who are going. But we already stipulated that only one person was going. The concept of movement has, once again, led to a contradiction.

7. If there were no goer, going would be impossible. If there were no going, where could a goer be existent?

Commentary: Something is a goer only by virtue of going. Something is going only by virtue of being a goer.

8. When a goer does not go, a non-goer cannot go; what third one other than a goer and a non-goer could go?

Commentary: The only thing that can go is a goer.

9. When a goer is impossible without going, then how is it possible to say: “a goer goes”? 

Commentary: The concept of movement leads to the concept of going and of a goer. As Verse 7 said, something is a goer by virtue of going. Therefore, for reasons that Verse 10 will explain, it is illegitimate to say, "A goer goes." At the same time, "A goer goes" must be true because we have seen that a goer is a goer by virtue of going. This is another contradiction that results from the concept of movement.

10. To claim that a goer goes implies that there could be a goer who does not go, because it is asserted that a goer goes. 

Commentary: Verse 9 said that if something is a goer by virtue of going, then "A goer goes" is an ill-formed sentence. To see why, consider the sentence "Bob walks." Bob remains Bob even if he doesn't walk. Hence, we would expect the sentence "A goer goes" to mean that the goer, who remains a goer even if he isn't going, is currently going. In other words, "A goer goes" seems to imply that the goer does not need to go in order to be a goer. However, if something is a goer by virtue of going, then a goer does need to go in order to be a goer. Therefore, if something is a goer by virtue of going, then we cannot say "A goer goes."

11. If the goer goes, it would follow that going would be twofold: that which reveals the goer and that which goes once [he] has become a goer.

Commentary: Here is another reason why "A goer goes" is ill-formed. Suppose that a goer is performing a single act of going. In that case, the goer is going, so we can say, "A goer goes." According to Verse 10, however, "A goer goes" implies that a goer does not need to go in order to be a goer. Therefore, we must posit two goings: (1) the going that makes the goer a goer and (2) the going that the goer does not need in order to be a goer. But we stipulated that the goer was performing only one act of going, not two. In this way, "A goer goes" leads to a contradiction.

12. If a beginning of going does not exist in what has gone, [if] a beginning of going does not exist also in what has not [yet] gone [and if] there does not exist a beginning within motion, wherein is a beginning of going made?

Commentary: If an object is currently moving, then the movement must have a beginning. Recall the Buddhist resistance to abstractions; if the movement has a beginning at all, if the beginning exists at all, then it must exist concretely, in some concrete object or location. Where does the beginning exist? Not on the path that the object has already covered, for nothing at all is there anymore. Not on the path that the object has not yet reached, for nothing at all has reached it yet. The only remaining possibility is that the beginning of the movement is at the spot where the object currently is ("a beginning within motion"). But movement cannot begin in a single moment at a single place; that isn't enough time or enough room for any movement to occur. Therefore, the beginning of the movement does not exist. But we said that if an object is moving, then the movement must have a beginning. Once again, the concept of movement has led to a contradiction.

13. Before a beginning of going, there is not any motion or anything which has gone wherein going could begin. How can going exist in what has not [yet] gone?

Commentary: If movement exists, then it must have a beginning. The very beginning of a movement must occur at a particular moment. Let's say that x's movement begins at t₁. In that case, x is moving at t₁. As Verse 12 says, however, a single moment is not enough time for any movement. If x is moving at t₁, then x must already have been moving at the immediately preceding moment, t₀ ("How can going exist in what has not [yet] gone?"). But we already stipulated that x's movement begins at t₁, so x cannot have been moving at t₀ ("Before a beginning of going, there is not any motion or anything which has gone wherein going could begin"). Once again, the concept of movement has led to a contradiction.

14. If a beginning of going is simply not apparent in any way, examine: what has gone? what is motion? what has not [yet] gone?

Commentary: Batchelor's translation of Verse 14, above, is hard to interpret. Jay L. Garfield offers a clearer translation:

Since the beginning of motion

Cannot be conceived in any way,

What gone thing, what going thing,

And what non-going thing can be posited?

Verses 12 and 13 showed that the concept of a beginning of movement falls apart upon close examination. If there is no beginning of movement, then there cannot be any past movement ("gone thing"), any present movement ("going thing"), or even any absence of movement ("non-going thing"). In short, if there is no beginning of movement, then there is neither movement nor non-movement.

Why not? To understand the answer, we must remember how we reached this point. We started with the concept of movement. According to early Buddhist metaphysics, everything other than nibbana has both a beginning and an end. At the very least, then, we would expect movement (one of the most obvious examples of a transient phenomenon) to have a beginning and an end. Therefore, the concept of movement carries with it the concept of a beginning of movement. We examined this second concept and reached the conclusion that there is no beginning of movement.

Now we can explain why there is neither movement nor non-movement. Starting with the concept of movement, we reached the conclusion that there is no beginning of movement. If there is no beginning of movement, then there is no movement. In short, the concept of movement leads to the conclusion that there is no movement. But this means that if we start with the statement "x is moving," we reach the conclusion "There is no movement." This is a contradiction. The very concept of movement leads to this contradiction. Hence, the very concept is incoherent. If the concept of movement is incoherent, then we cannot say either that movement exists or that movement does not exist, since both statements involve the concept of movement.

15. When a goer does not stay, a non-goer cannot stay; what third one other than a goer and a non-goer could stay. 

16. When a goer is not possible without going, how then is it possible [to say]: “a goer stays.” 

Commentary: In these verses, Nagarjuna argues that the concept of staying is just as problematic as the concept of moving or going. Something is a goer by virtue of going ("a goer is not possible without going"). Going is the opposite of staying. Therefore, a goer cannot stay while remaining a goer. According to Nagarjuna, a non-goer cannot stay either. Because everything is either a goer or a non-goer ("what third one other than a goer and a non-goer"), it follows that nothing can stay.

Why does Nagarjuna think that a non-goer cannot stay? Isn't a non-goer by definition a stayer?

The answer, I think, begins with Verses 10 and 11. According to Verse 10, the statement "A goer goes" implies that a goer might not go. The underlying assumption is that if we say, "A goer goes," if we predicate going of a goer, then we're treating the going and the goer as two distinct and, therefore, separable things. But if the going and the goer are two separable things, Verse 11 points out, then the goer must contain another, separate going by which he is a goer, and the going that we originally mentioned must be something external to him. By the same reasoning, if we say, "A goer stays," if we predicate staying of a goer, then we're implying that the goer contains a going by which he is a goer and that the staying is something external to him. Likewise, if we say, "A non-goer stays," if we predicate staying of a non-goer, then we're implying that the non-goer contains a non-going, separate from the staying, by which he is a non-goer, and the staying is external to him.

Now we can explain why a non-goer cannot stay. As we have seen, if a non-goer were to stay, then the staying would be external to the goer and separate from the going by which the goer is a goer. As we have also seen, however, a goer still cannot stay. a non-goer cannot stay. If staying is incompatible with the goer even though the staying is external to the goer and separate from the going by which he is a goer, then there is something defective about the concept of staying; staying must not be compatible with, or predicable of, anything. Hence, we cannot even predicate staying of a non-goer; even a non-goer cannot stay.

17. There is no reversal of motion, nor also of what has gone [and] what has not [yet] gone. [Reversal of] going, engagement [to stay] and reversal [of staying] are similar to going.

Commentary: We have seen that going and staying are impossible. The same reasoning would show that reversal of movement is impossible. Going and reversal are "similar to going" in that they are all impossible.

18. It is inappropriate to say: “going and a goer are the same.” It is inappropriate to say: “going and a goer are different.”

Commentary: On one hand, going is not the same as being a goer. On the other hand, going is not different from being a goer.

19. If whatever is going were a goer, it would follow that the actor and the act would be the same too.

Commentary: Verse 18 said that going is not the same as being a goer. Why aren't they the same? One answer involves comparing going to acting. If going is the same as being a goer, then it follows that acting is the same as being an actor. But (Nagarjuna implies) acting is not the same as being an actor (presumably because an actor, someone who performs actions, is not always performing actions). Therefore, going isn't the same as being an actor.

20. If going and a goer were conceived as different, there could be going without a goer and a goer without going.

Commentary: Verse 18 said that going is not different from being a goer. Why aren't they the same? The answer lies in the meaning of "goer." By definition, a goer is someone who goes. In other words, someone is a goer by virtue of going. Therefore, someone cannot be a goer without going. But, as Verse 20 says, if going were different from being a goer, then someone could be a goer without going. Therefore, going is not different from being a goer.

21. If things are not established as the same and as different, how can they be established?

Commentary: Verse 18 said that going is neither the same as nor different from being a goer. But in order for x and y to exist ("be established"), x and y must be either the same or different. Therefore, the concept of going and goers is incoherent.

22. That very going by which a goer is made evident does not [enable a goer to] go. Because there is no [goer] before going, who would be going where?

Commentary: Before going occurs, there is no goer. If there is no goer, then there is nothing that can go, for a non-goer clearly cannot go. Therefore, if there is no goer, then someone must first become a goer before he can perform the act of going. In other words, there must be another going that makes the goer a goer, distinct from the going that the goer then performs; the going that the goer performs doesn't make the goer a goer.

23. [A going] which is other than the going by which a goer is made evident does not [enable a goer to] go. Because it is impossible for going to be twofold within a single goer.

Commentary: According to Verse 22, a goer is a goer not because of the going that he performs but, rather, because of a second going. At the same time, we can't say that a goer is a goer because of a second going ("[a going] which is other than the going by which a goer is made evident"), because a single goer can have only one act of going at a time ("it is impossible for going to be twofold within a single goer"). In short, we must say that a goer has a second going, and we also must not say that a goer has a second going. Yet again, the concept of going has led to a contradiction.

24. One who is a goer does not go in the three aspects of going. Also one who is not [a goer] does not go in the three aspects of going.

25. One who is and is not [a goer] also does not go in the three aspects of going. Therefore, going and a goer and also that which is gone over do not exist.

Commentary: "The three aspects of going" are the path already gone over, the path not yet gone over, and the point where the goer currently is. We have seen that a goer does not go in any sense. We have also seen that a non-goer does not go in any sense. It follows that someone who is both a goer and a non-goer does not go in any sense. In short, no one is capable of going in any sense. The idea of anyone going is incoherent.

3.  Investigation of the Sense Organs

1.  Seeing and hearing and smelling and tasting and touching, mind are the six sense organs; their experienced objects are what-is-seen and so forth.

Commentary: According to Buddhist tradition, there are six senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and mind. Sight detects visible forms; hearing detects sounds; smell detects odors; taste detects flavors; touch detects tactile qualities; and mind detects mental objects.

2.  Seeing does not see itself.  How can what does not see itself see anything else?

Commentary: The argument in this verse becomes more plausible if we compare it to what I call the Control Argument in the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta. According to my interpretation, the Control Argument rests on the assumption that if a person cannot control x, then the person must be separated from x in some way. If this assumption is correct, it is presumably correct because one's influence over x decreases as one's separation from x increases. Each thing is less separated from itself than from other things. Therefore, the sense of sight should have more influence over itself than over other things. Because it can't see itself, it shouldn't be able to see other things.

3. The example of fire is not able to fully establish seeing. It, along with seeing, has been refuted by “gone”, “not gone” and “going.”

Commentary: According to a principle that Indian philosophers commonly accepted and that Mark Siderits calls "the Anti-Reflexivity Principle," an agent can act only on things other than itself. The stock example is fire, which burns other things but not itself. One might object to the argument in Verse 2 by appealing to the Anti-Reflexivity Principle: just as we shouldn't be surprised that fire burns other things but not itself, so we shouldn't be surprised if sight sees other things but not itself.

In response to this objection, Nagarjuna replies that the concept of fire is incoherent and, therefore, cannot be used to show that the concept of sight is coherent ("The example of fire is not able to fully establish seeing"). Why is fire incoherent? For the same reason going is incoherent. In the Chapter 2, we saw that going can't be currently happening in the past ("gone"), in the future ("not gone"), or at the present moment ("going"), because the past and future don't currently exist and a single moment isn't enough time for movement to occur. Likewise, a fire's burning can't currently be happening in the past, future, or present, because the past and future don't currently exist and the present moment isn't enough time for any burning to occur. By the same reasoning, sight can't be currently happening in the past, present, or future. Burning and sight are just as incoherent as going.

4. When not seeing the slightest thing, there is no act of seeing. How can it [then] be reasonable to say: “seeing sees”?

Commentary: This verse echoes another argument from Chapter 2, where we saw that the statement "A goer goes" implies that the going by which the goer goes is not the seeing by which the goer is a goer. By the same reasoning, the statement "Sight sees" implies that the seeing by which sight sees is not the seeing by which sight is sight. If this implication were true, then there could be sight without seeing; however, there cannot be sight without seeing ("When not seeing the slightest thing, there is no [sight occurring]"). Therefore, it's incorrect to say, "Sight sees."

5. Seeing does not see; non-seeing does not see. It should be understood that seeing explains the seer too.

Commentary: According to early Buddhist metaphysics, as preserved in the abhidhamma tradition, there are no substances. Imagine a flower with many diverse properties: colors, shapes, textures, a temperature, etc. According to abhidhammic metaphysics, the flower is not a single, underlying substance that possesses all those properties but, rather, an aggregrate of the properties themselves. Therefore, a Buddhist philosopher can't say that sight is an act performed by a substance and that the substance—rather than the activity or property of sight itself—is what sees; if anything at all sees, then it can only be sight itself ("non-seeing does not see"). At the same time, Verse 4 said that seeing can't see either ("seeing does not see"). Therefore, the idea that something sees is incoherent. And because someone is a seer by virtue of seeing ("seeing explains the seer too"), the concept of a seer is also incoherent.

6.  Without letting go of [seeing] a seer does not exist; in letting go of seeing, there is also [no seer].  If there is no seer, where can there be what-is-seen and seeing?

Commentary: The concepts of what-is-seen and of seeing are inseparable from the concept of a seer ("If there is no seer, where can there be what-is-seen and seeing?"). Verse 4 said that "Sight sees" implies that the seeing by which sight sees is not the seeing by which sight is sight. By the same reasoning, "A seer sees" implies that the seeing by which the seer sees is not the seeing by which the seer is a seer. In short, the seer is not a seer by virtue of (the first-mentioned act of) seeing; for any seer, we must posit a certain separation between the seer and his seeing ("Without letting go of [seeing] a seer does not exist"). At the same time, it is absurd to say that the seer is a seer apart from his seeing ("in letting go of seeing, there is also [no seer]"). Therefore, the concept of a seer is incoherent. The concept of a seer is inseparably bound up with the concepts of sight ("seeing") and of a visible object ("what-is-seen"). Because the concept of a seer is incoherent, so are the concepts of sight and a visible object ("If there is no seer, where can there be what-is-seen and seeing?").

7.  Just as it is said that a child emerges in dependence on a father and a mother, likewise it is said that consciousness emerges in dependence upon an eye and a visual form.

Commentary: According to the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination, each thing exists because of other things. For example, a child exists because of its father and mother. Likewise, according to skandha theory, consciousness occurs because of contact between a sense and its object. For example, "eye-consciousness"—that is, awareness of an object's visible form—results from contact between the sense of sight and a visible form.

8. Because there is no what-is-seen and no seeing, the four such as consciousness do not exist. How can clinging etc. exist?

Commentary: According to Verse 7, eye-consciousness results from contact between the sense of sight and a visible form. Hence, if the concepts of sight and of visible form are incoherent, then so is the concept of eye-consciousness. According to Verse 6, the concepts of sight and visible form are incoherent ("there is no what-is-seen and no seeing"). Therefore, the concept of eye-consciousness is incoherent.

This point generalizes to all mental activities, not just eye-consciousness. The same reasoning that showed that the concepts of sight and visible form are incoherent would, if applied to the other senses, show that the concepts of those senses and of their objects are also incoherent. According to the Sattaṭṭhāna Sutta, the four mental skandhas (sensation, perception, formations, and consciousness—that is, all the skandhas except the body) result from contact between a sense and its object. Because all concepts of senses and of sense-objects are incoherent, it follows that the four mental skandhas are impossible ("the four such as consciousness do not exist").

Although this rejection of the four skandhas is already a major break with the earlier Buddhist tradition, Nagarjuna is prepared to go even further. As we have seen, mental skandhas are impossible. Without mental skandhas, there can be no (conscious) suffering, for (conscious) suffering is a mental state. Nor can there be clinging, for clinging is motivated by intention or desire, which is part of the formations skandha, a mental skandha. It's a basic Buddhist doctrine that suffering results from clinging. In a move clearly meant to shock complacent Buddhist philosophers, Nagarjuna denies this doctrine by concluding that there is no clinging—and, presumably, no suffering either ("How can clinging etc. exist?").

9. It should be understood that seeing explains hearing and smelling and tasting and touching, mind, hearer, what is heard, etc.

Commentary: The argument in Verse 8 relies on the premise that if sight and visible objects don't exist, then the other senses and their objects don't exist either. Verse 9 states this premise explicitly.

4. Investigation of the Aggregates

1. Apart from the cause of form, form is not perceived. Apart from “form”, the cause of form also does not appear.

Commentary: Before form exists, there is no cause of form ("Apart from 'form', the cause of form also does not appear"). But if there is no cause of form, then form can't start to exist ("Apart from the cause of form, form is not perceived"). So form doesn't exist originally, and it can't start to exist. Therefore, form doesn't exist.

2. If there were form apart from the cause of form, it would follow that form is without cause; there is no object at all that is without cause.

Commentary: Verse 1's argument rests on the premise that form can't start to exist if there is no cause of form. The argument for this premise is simple. Nothing can exist without a cause ("there is no object at all that is without cause"). Therefore, form can't exist without a cause.

3. If a cause of form existed apart from form, it would exist as a cause without fruit; causes without fruit do not exist.

Commentary: Verse 1's argument also rests on the premise that before form exists, there is no cause of form. Recall the Buddhist resistance to abstractions: before x exists concretely, x doesn't exist at all. Therefore, before form exists concretely, form doesn't exist at all. If form doesn't exist at all, then nothing can have a relation to form. Something is the cause of form only in relation to form. Therefore, before form exists concretely, there is no cause of form.

4. If form existed, a cause of form would be untenable; if form did not exist, a cause of form would be untenable.

Commentary: Verse 1 pointed out that if there is no form, then there can be no cause of form, and that if there is no cause of form, then there can be no form. Now Nagarjuna says that even if there were form, there could be no cause of form, and that even if a cause of form existed, there could be no form. So neither form nor its cause is possible.

5. Forms which do not have a cause are not at all tenable. Therefore, do not conceive the concept of form at all.

Commentary: Verse 4 said that even if there were a cause of form, there would still be no form. Of course, if there were no cause of form, then there would be no form either ("Forms which do not have a cause are not at all tenable"). We again reach the conclusion that form is impossible ("Therefore, do not conceive the concept of form at all").

6. It is untenable to say, “the fruit is like the cause.” It is also untenable to say, “the fruit is unlike the cause.”

Commentary: The argument in Verses 4 and 5 depends on the premise that there would be no form even if there were a cause of form. Nagarjuna now defends that premise. An effect ("fruit") can't be completely "like" its cause, because cause and effect must be two different events. At the same time, the effect can't be "unlike" the cause: the cause is supposed to explain the effect, and the cause can't explain features of the effect that aren't included in the cause. Therefore, an effect can be neither like nor unlike its cause. If a cause of form produced a form—that is, if the form were the effect of the cause—then the form would be either "like" or "unlike" the cause. Therefore, even a cause of form can't produce a form; even with a cause of form, there can be no form.

7. Feeling and perception, impulses and mind and all things are comparable in every aspect, at every stage with form.

Commentary: The preceding verses argued that form is impossible because of considerations regarding causation. The same considerations would apply to the four other skandhas and to everything else, since everything depends on a cause for its existence ("Feeling and perception, impulses and mind and all things are comparable in every aspect, at every stage with form"). Therefore, if those considerations make form impossible, then they also make everything else impossible.

8. When having argued by means of emptiness, everything of that one who objects is not an objection; it is similar to what is to be established. 

9. When having explained by means of emptiness, everything of that one who finds fault is not a fault; it is similar to what is to be established. 

Commentary: Here is how Jay L. Garfield translates these verses:

When an analysis is made through emptiness,

If someone were to offer a reply,

That reply will fail, since it will presuppose

Exactly what is to be proven.

When an explanation is made through emptiness,

Whever would find fault with it

Will find no fault, since the criticism will presuppose

Exactly what is to be proven.

Any objection to emptiness will presuppose what it needs to prove. The objection will appeal to some objects or events whose existence is taken to refute emptiness. In the very act of referring to these particular things, the objector presupposes that they have essences, for a thing's essence is, by definition, what distinguishes that particular thing from other things. But that assumption—that is, that things have essences—is precisely what the opponent of emptiness needs to prove.

5. Investigation of the Elements

1. Not the slightest bit of space exists prior to the characteristics of space. If [space] existed prior to its characteristics, it would follow that it would be without characteristics.

Commentary: If something—for example, space—existed before its characteristics, then it would exist without characteristics. Nothing can exist without characteristics. Therefore, nothing can exist before its characteristics.

2. A thing without characteristics does not exist anywhere at all. If a thing without characteristics does not exist, to what do characteristics extend?

Commentary: x is distinct from y if and only if x can exist apart from y. Verse 1 said that nothing can exist before its characteristics ("A thing without characteristics does not exist anywhere at all"). Therefore, the distinction between thing and its characteristics breaks down. y belongs to x only if y is distinct from x. Therefore, the characteristics don't belong to thing. At the same time, the characteristics must belong ("extend") to something or other, and if we say that the characteristics don't belong to the thing, then they're left with nothing to belong to ("to what do characeristics extend?"). Starting with the concept of something having characteristics (in Verse 1), we have reached a contradiction.

3. Characteristics do not extend to that which has no characteristics; nor to what possesses characteristics. They also cannot extend to something other than what either possesses or does not have characteristics.

Commentary: On one hand, a characteristic can't belong to something that has characteristics. On the other hand, a characteristic can't belong to something that lacks characteristics. Everything must either have nor lack characteristics ("They also cannot extend to something other than what either possesses or does not have characteristics"). Therefore, a characteristic can't belong to anything. Verse 2 implied that every characteristic must belong ("extend") to something or other. Hence, the concept of characteristics has led to a contradiction.

4. If characteristics do not extend [to something], something characterized would be impossible. If something characterized is impossible, characteristics too would not exist.

Commentary: The arguments in Verse 2 and 3 rest on the assumption that if there are characteristics, then they must belong to something. Now Nagarjuna explains why he accepts that assumption. Characteristics exist only insofar as something has such-and-such a character ("something is characterized"). But a thing has a character only insofar as characteristics belong to the thing ("If characteristics do not extend [to something], something characterized would be impossible"). Therefore, characteristics exist only insofar as they belong to something.

5. Therefore, something characterized does not exist and characteristics do not exist. There also does not exist a thing which is apart from being something characterized or a characteristic.

Commentary: Verse 2 showed that the concept of something having characteristics is contradictory. Verse 3 showed that the concept of characteristics is contradictory. Therefore, neither something having characteristics ("something characterized") nor characteristics themselves exist. Everything is either a characteristic or something having characteristics ("There also does not exist a thing which is apart from being something characterized or a characteristic"). Therefore, nothing exists.

6. If there is not a thing, of what can there be a non-thing? By whom are the opposites thing and non-thing known [as] a thing and a non-thing?

Commentary: At the same time, we can't say that nothing exists. If we say that nothing exists, then we are employing a distinction between things and nothing. But if, as the preceding verses suggest, the very concept of a thing is incoherent, then the concept of nothing is also incoherent ("If there is not a thing, of what can there be a non-thing?"). Hence, the thing/nothing distinction breaks down and, therefore, we can't say that nothing exists.

Moreover, if we say that nothing exists, we are claiming to know that nothing exists. If we know that nothing exists, then someone must be doing the knowing. But if nothing exists, then there is no one do to the knowing ("By whom are the opposites thing and non-thing known [as] a thing and a non-thing?"). Therefore, any attempt to claim that nothing exists involves one in a contradiction.

7. Therefore, space is not a thing; it is not a non-thing; it is not something characterized; it is not a characteristic. The other five elements too are similar to space.

Commentary: The preceding verses have shown that the concepts of thing, nothing, thing having characteristics, and characteristics themselves are all incoherent. Therefore, space—recognized in Theravada as an element—is neither a thing nor nothing, neither a characteristic nor something having a characteristic. The same reasoning would show that "the five other elements" are neither things nor nothing, neither characteristics nor things with characteristics. (Theravada orthodoxy recognizes six elements: the four primary elements of earth, air, fire, and water, and the two secondary elements of space and consciousness.)

8. Those of small minds see things as existent and non-existent. They do not behold the utter pacification of what is seen.

Commentary: As we have seen, neither the concept of a thing nor the concept of nothing is coherent. Hence, those who "see things as existing or non-existent" are deluded. "The utter pacification of what is seen" is the peace that comes from realizing that neither concept applies to reality in itself.

6. Investigation of Desire and the Desirous One

1. If a desirous one without desire exists before desire, desire would exist dependent on that [desirous one]. [When] a desirous one exists, desire exists.

Commentary: When we say that a dog runs, the dog was a dog before the running started. Hence, one might conclude that when we say that a desirer ("desirous one") desires, the desirer was a desirer before the desire started.

This verse points out that such a conclusion is incorrect. Suppose that the desirer was a desirer before the desire started. If he was a desirer at that time, then he must have had desire ("[When] a desirous one exists, desire exists"). Hence, even if we say that he was a desirer before the desire started, we must still posit another desire that he had at the time ("If a desirous one without desire exists before desire, desire would exist dependent on that [desirous one]").

2. If there were no desirous one, how could there be desire? The same follows for the desirous one too: [it depends on] whether desire exists or not.

Commentary: The upshot of Verse 1 is that the existence of a desirer depends on the existence of desire ("The same follows for the desirous one too: [it depends on] whether desire exists or not"). Likewise, the existence of desire depends on the existence of a desirer ("If there were no desirous one, how could there be desire?"). Therefore, neither desire nor desirer exists without the other.

3. It is not reasonable for desire and the desirous one to arise as co-existent. In this way desire and the desirous one would not be mutually contingent.

Commentary: If neither desire nor desirer exists without the other, then are they two things that exist in the same place at the same time ("arise as co-existent")? No, because if they were two separate things and appeared at exactly the same time, then neither would depend on the other for its existence ("In this way desire and the desirous one would not be mutually contingent"), and we saw in Verse 2 that they do depend on each other for their existence.

4. Identity has no co-existence: something cannot be co-existent with itself. If there were difference, how could there be co-existence?

Commentary: Here is another reason why desire and desirer can't be two things that exist in the same place at the same time. If they were two things that appear simultaneously, then they would not be identical ("Identity has no co-existence"). At the same time, they would not be different, for if they inhabit exactly the same volume of space for exactly the same period of time, they would not differ in any way ("If there were difference, how could there be co-existence?"). Therefore, if desire and desirer were two things that exist in the same place at the same time, then they would be neither identical nor different. But they must be either identical or different. Therefore, they are not two things that exist in the same place at the same time.

5. If the identical were co-existent, [co-existence] would also occur between the unrelated; if the different were co-existent, [co-existence] would also occur between the unrelated.

Commentary: Verse 4 said that two things that exist in the same place at the same time can be neither identical nor different. Here is an argument in defense of that premise.

The argument begins by noting that identity excludes relation. One part of a thing can have a relation to another part of the same thing, but there is no real relation between a thing and itself. (Here I am setting aside pseudo-relations such as "self-identity.") Therefore, if there were identity between two things that exist at the same place at the same time, then the two things would be completely unrelated ("If the identical were co-existent, [co-existence] would also occur between the unrelated").

Next, the argument notes that difference also excludes relation. If x and y are truly different, separate objects, then neither depends on the other for its existence. For example, we normally think of a person and the air that he is breathing as two separate objects, and by this we mean that the person can exist independently of the air, and vice versa. Of course, if we deprived the person of air, he would quickly die. This, however, is merely external, billiard-ball causation, the kind of causation in which Hume could perceive no genuine connection or relation. This lack of a genuine dependence relation is shown by the fact that the person still exists as a person for a few moments after being separated from the air; if the person's very existence as a person depended on the air, then he would not be able to exist for even a moment without air. Therefore, if there were difference between two things that exist at the same place at the same time, then the two things would be completely unrelated ("if the different were co-existent, [co-existence] would also occur between the unrelated").

From the two premises above, it follows that things that exist at the same place at the same time can be neither identical nor different. If x exists at the same place at the same time as y, there must be a reason. It is unreasonable to think that such an alignment would occur by mere chance. Therefore, if x exists at the same time and place as y, then x must be related to y. As we have seen, however, x and y would be completely unrelated if x and y were either identical or different. Therefore, if x exists at the same time and place as y, then x and y can be neither identical nor different.

6. If the different were co-existent, how would desire and the desirous one be established as different or, if that were so, [how would] those two be co-existent? 

7. If desire and the desirous were established as different, because of what could one understand them as co-existent?

Commentary: This verse reinforces Verse 5's claim that if x exists at exactly the same time and place as y, then x and y can't be different. If desire and desirer inhabit exactly the same region of space during exactly the same period of time, then it's unclear what makes them different (what "establishes" them "as different"). Moreover, if they differ, then it's unreasonable to expect that they would inhabit exactly the same region of space during exactly the same period of time.

8. If one asserts them to be co-existent because they are not established as different, then because they would be very much established as co-existent, would one not also have to assert them to be different?

Commentary: The concept of two things existing at the same place at the same time is incoherent. As Verse 5 said, if x exists at the same place and time as y, then x is not different from y. In other words, only if x and y "are not established as different" can x and y be "established as co-existent." But if x and y are two things existing in the same place at the same time, then x can't be the same thing as y; they must be different ("because they would be very much established as co-existent, would one not also have to assert them to be different"). Hence, if x and y exist in the same place at the same time, then we reach a contradiction: x and y are both different and not different.

9. Since different things are not established, co-existent things are not established. If there existed any different things, one could assert them as co-existent things. 

Commentary: We can expose the incoherence in another way. If x is a different thing from y, then it's possible for x and y to exist at the same place at the same time; that is, we can conceive of the two things existing at the same place at the same time ("If there existed any different things, one could assert them as co-existent things"). As Verse 5 said, however, if x and y exist at the same place at the same time, then x can't be different from y. And if x isn't different from y—that is, if x and y are identical—then x and y can't be two things existing at the same place at the same time ("Since different things are not established, co-existent things are not established"). Therefore, if x is different from y, then they can exist at the same place at the same time, but if they exist at the same place at the same time, then they are not different and, therefore, do not exist at the same place at the same time. In other words, if x is different from y, then x and y are both different and not different.

10. In that way, desire and the desirous one are not established as co-existent or not co-existent. Like desire, all phenomena are not established as co-existent or not co-existent.

Commentary: As the verses above show, two things can't be present at the same place at the same time ("not established as co-existent"). A desirer is a desirer only when he has desire, and desire occurs only when a desirer is present. Hence, desire and desirer must exist at the same place at the same time ("desire and the desirous one are not established ... as not-coexistent"). At the same time, they can't exist at the same place at the same time ("are not established as co-existent"), as the verses above show. Therefore, the concept of desire and desirer is incoherent: desire and desirer both must and must not exist at the same place and time. The same reasoning, applied to other phenomena, would show that they are incoherent in the same way ("Like desire, all phenomena are not established as co-existent or not co-existent").

7. Investigation of Birth, Abiding and Perishing

1. If birth were compounded, it would possess the three characteristics [of a compound]. If birth were uncompounded, how would it be a characteristic of a compound?

Commentary: "The three characteristics of a compound" are birth, abiding, and perishing. If we say that these characteristics characterize compounds, then a question arises: are these three characteristics themselves compounds? For example, is birth a compound? It turns out that birth can't be a compound and also must be a compound. The concept of birth—and, by the same token, the concepts of the other two characteristics—leads to a contradiction.

On one hand, we can't say that birth is a compound. If birth were a compound, then birth itself would have the three characteristics ("If birth were compounded, it would possess the three characteristics [of a compound]"). As Verse 3 will explain, birth itself can't have the three characteristics.

On the other hand, we can't say that birth is not a compound. The second sentence of Verse 1 is supposed to explain why, but Batchelor's translation of that sentence is less than illuminating. The text seems to say that if birth were not a compound, then it could not be a characteristic of a compound, but the text doesn't explain why. Garfield's translation is more helpful: "If [birth] is not [compounded], / How could the characteristics of the [compounded] exist?" Birth is one of the three characteristics of compounds. If birth is not compounded—that is, if birth is not constructed or produced—then how can birth exist? More generally, if the three characteristics are not compounded—not constructed or produced—then how can they exist? Where do they come from?

2. The three such as birth cannot individually be that which characterises compounds. How is it possible for one at one time to be compounded [of all three]?

Commentary: If birth, abiding, and perishing are the three characteristics of compounds, then there are two possibilities: a compound either has only one of the three characteristics at a time or has more than one at a time. Neither possibility ultimately makese sense.

On one hand, it doesn't make sense to say that a compound has one of the characteristics at a time ("The three such as birth cannot individually be that which characterises compounds"). Suppose that a compound, x, has only one of the three characteristics, say abiding. In that case, we know that x will soon have the characteristic of perishing, for everything is born, abides briefly, and then perishes. But because x currently has only the characteristic of abiding, it's impossible to explain how x comes to have a different characteristic, perishing.

On the other hand, it doesn't make sense to say that a compound has more than one of the characteristics simultaneously. For example, it's impossible for a compound to have all three characteristics at once ("How is it possible for one at one time to be compounded [of all three]?"), because the three characteristics are mutually exclusive: if you are being born, then you aren't perishing yet; if you are abiding, then you have already been born; and if you are perishing, then you are no longer abiding.

3. If birth, abiding and perishing had an other characteristic of being compounded, this would be endless. If not, they would not be compounded.

Commentary: Verse 1's argument rested on the premise that birth—and, by extension, abiding and perishing—can't have the three characteristics of birth, abiding, and perishing. Now Nagarjuna explains why birth, abiding, and perishing can't have the three characteristics: the result would be an endless regress.

To see why an endless regress would result, let's first ask why birth would have the three characteristics in the first place. Presumably, if birth had the three characteristics, then it would have them as a result of being a compound. For if birth were a compound, then it would need to have the three characteristics of a compound, including birth. Hence, if birth were a compound, then we would have to posit a second birth that is a characteristic of the first birth. But since birth is a compound and, therefore, has the three characteristics, the second birth would also have the three characteristics. Hence, we would need to posit a third birth that is a characteristic of the second birth. And so on ad infinitum ("If birth, abiding and perishing had an other characteristic of being compounded, this would be endless").

4. The birth of birth gives birth to the root birth alone. The root birth also is that which gives birth to the birth of birth.

Commentary: Verse 3 showed that if birth were compounded, then the result would be an endless regress of births. The birth of an object would itself be born, and that second-order birth would also be born, and that third-order birth would also be born, and so on ad infinitum.

At this point, one might ask why an endless regress is a problem. Why can't we say that whenever there's a birth, there supervenes an infinite series of ever higher-order births?

Here's the answer. When an object comes into existence, its birth comes into existence. This birth is a first-order ("root") birth because it is the birth of an object rather than a birth of birth. Because this first-order birth comes into existence, we can say that the first-order birth is born, thereby positing a second-order birth. The second-order birth is the birth of the first-order birth, so the second-order birth gives birth to the first-order birth ("The birth of birth gives birth to the root birth alone"). At the same time, the first-order birth gives birth to the second-order birth ("The root birth also is that which gives birth to the birth of birth"), since the entire series of births, including the second-order one, depends on the first-order birth. Therefore, if we posit an endless regress of ever higher-order births, then both of the following statements are true: (a) the second-order birth is the source of the first-order birth, and (b) the first-order birth is the source of the second-order birth. But those statements can't both be true. Therefore, such an endless regress is impossible.

5. If your birth of birth gives birth to the root birth, how does that which is not yet born from your root give birth to that [root birth]?